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 An Empirical Look at the “Brokered” 
Market for Patents 







We study five years of data on patents listed and sold in the quasi-public 
“brokered” market.  Our data covers almost 39,000 assets, an estimated eighty 
percent of all patents and applications offered for sale by patent brokers be-
tween 2012 and 2016.  We provide statistics on the size and composition of the 
brokered market, including the types of buyers and sellers who participate in 
the market, the types of patents listed and sold on the market, and how market 
conditions have changed over time.  We conclude with an analysis of what our 
data can tell us about how to accurately value technology, the costs and bene-
fits of patent monetization, and the brokered market’s ability to measure the 
impact of changes to patent law. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Scholars, attorneys, and business professionals have long bemoaned the 
lack of available data on the market for patent transactions.1  While resources 
exist to value cars, real estate, coins, comic books, and myriad other goods and 
services, no equivalent exists for patent rights.2  Despite producing billions of 
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 1. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 257, 257–59 (2007) (describing problems created by the “blind 
market” for patents and proposing mandatory publication of patent license and sale 
terms as a solution); Anne Kelley, Practicing in the Patent Marketplace, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 115, 116–17 (2011) (“[B]oth scholars and practitioners are seeking ways to im-
prove how patents are valued, with scholars often calling for greater disclosure of sale 
terms to aid in setting market prices and practitioners focusing on refining methods for 
predicting a patent’s value to their own clients.”). 
 2. See, e.g., KELLEY BLUE BOOK, https://www.kbb.com/car-values/ (last visited 
May 22, 2018) (listing price estimates for used cars); REDFIN, https://www.redfin.com/ 
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dollars in annual revenues worldwide,3 the market for licensing and buying 
patent rights operates in near total darkness.  Virtually all deals are negotiated 
in secret and thereafter come to light only rarely.4  As a result, potential buyers 
and sellers often have a hard time locating one another and, when they do, often 
cannot agree on the appropriate methodology for determining a price, let alone 
what that price should be.5 
 
(last visited May 22, 2018) (listing price estimates for residential real estate); Coin 
Price Guides, COINWEEK, http://www.coinweek.com/coin-prices/coin-price-guides/ 
(last visited May 22, 2018) (listing more than twenty publications and websites that 
estimate market prices for collectable coins); Comic Book Price Guide, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comic_book_price_guide (last visited May 22, 2018) 
(listing more than ten publications and websites that estimate market prices for comic 
books). 
 3. See Federico Caviggioli & Elisa Ughetto, The Drivers of Patent Transactions: 
Corporate Views on the Market for Patents, 43 R&D MGMT. 318, 319 (2013) (collect-
ing estimates that place annual, worldwide revenue from patent transactions as high as 
$100 billion in 2003).  But see Ashish Arora et al., Markets for Technology in the 
Knowledge Economy, 54 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 115, 118 (2002) (estimating that the global 
market for all technology licensing is between $30 and $50 billion annually); Kelley, 
supra note 1, at 115 (reporting that the worldwide market for technology licensing “ap-
proached or exceeded $90 billion per year since 2003”).  Recent years have seen mul-
tiple public portfolio sales in the nine- to ten-figure range.  See, e.g., Andrew Martin, 
Kodak to Sell Digital Imaging Patents for $525 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/business/kodak-to-sell-patents-for-525-mil-
lion.html; Peg Brickley, Nortel $4.5-Billion Patent Sale to Apple, Microsoft, Others 
Approved, WALL ST. J. (July 11, 2011, 3:14 PM), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB10001424052702303812104576440161959082234; Zack Whittaker, Chip De-
signer MIPS Acquired for $60m; Patents Sold for $350m, ZDNET (Nov. 6, 2012, 
10:53), http://www.zdnet.com/article/chip-designer-mips-acquired-for-60m-patents-
sold-for-350m/. 
 4. See Lemley & Myhrvold, supra note 1, at 257 (noting that “[e]ven if [a] patent 
or ones like it have been licensed dozens of times before, the terms of those licenses, 
including the price itself, will almost invariably be confidential”); Kelley, supra note 
1, at 130 n.82 (noting that “[t]he vast majority of IP licenses and technology sales occur 
on confidential bases” and that “confidentiality is often highly negotiated between the 
parties”).  In our experience, parties to a patent transaction opt for confidentiality 
largely due to uncertainty about how the market and their competitors will interpret the 
sale.  Nonetheless, some licenses and sales become public when, for example, securities 
regulations require their disclosure.  See infra note 15.  Others are occasionally admit-
ted into evidence in patent suits.  See Tejas N. Narechania & Jackson Taylor Kirklin, 
An Unsettling Development: The Use of Settlement-Related Evidence for Damages De-
terminations in Patent Litigation, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 19–25 (collecting 
court orders discussing the discoverability and admissibility of patent licenses). 
 5. Andrei Hagiu & David B. Yoffie, The New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms, 
Defensive Aggregators, and Super-Aggregators, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 45–46 (2013) 
(“[P]atent buyers and sellers frequently have a hard time finding each other . . . . and 
when buyers and sellers do find each other they usually negotiate  under  enormous  
uncertainty: prices  of  similar  patents vary widely from transaction to transaction and 
the terms of the transactions (including prices) are often secret and confidential.”); 
2
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In addition to throwing sand in the gears of the market for patent rights, 
this lack of transparency contributes indirectly to many of the patent system’s 
gravest ills.  Many worry, for example, that damages awarded in litigation lack 
a meaningful connection to the real world value of patented technology, in part 
because so much of the market is unobservable.6  A lack of reliable pricing 
information also opens the door for arbitrage, a factor contributing to the rise 
of “patent assertion entities” (“PAEs”) – patent monetization specialists that 
are uniquely able to wield various forms of “holdup” power over the parties 
they sue in order to extract settlements that reflect more than the value of the 
asserted patent.7  Conversely, the costs inherent in participating in an ineffi-
cient market contribute to the fact that many tech companies choose to turn a 
 
Caviggioli & Ughetto, supra note 3, at 326 (finding, in a survey of corporate parties 
involved in patent transactions, that “[w]hen asked to rate the major obstacles hamper-
ing the growth of these marketplaces, our respondents identify the most relevant factors 
as information asymmetries and lack of shared methods to assess the economic value 
of patents”). 
 6. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and Misuse of Patent Licenses, 110 NW. 
U. L. REV. 115, 121 (2015) (arguing that the process of awarding patent damages based 
on prior comparable settlements is “ineluctably circular”); Lemley & Myhrvold, supra 
note 1, at 257 (explaining that because the patent market lacks transparency “courts 
lack adequate benchmarks to determine a ‘reasonable royalty’ when companies infringe 
patents”). 
 7. See Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 5, at 51 (“In essence, nonpracticing entities 
act as arbitrageurs, first acquiring patents, typically from individual inventors or small 
companies, and then seeking licensing revenues from operating companies through lit-
igation . . . .”).  The term “patent assertion entity” is typically defined to encompass all 
non-practicing patent enforcers, except universities, early stage startups, and IP holding 
subsidiaries of operating technology companies.  See Informational Hearing on Patent 
Assertion Entities Before the California Assembly Select Committee on High Technol-
ogy (Oct. 30, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm.?abstract_id=2347138 
(statement of Brian J. Love, Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara Univ.).  Because 
PAEs do not compete with the companies that they sue, they are able to take advantage 
of several holdup opportunities that are generally not available to operating companies.  
For example, because PAEs do not sell products that compete with those produced by 
alleged infringers, they are able to avoid countersuit and thus can generally leverage 
asymmetric litigation costs against the parties they sue.  See id.  In addition, because 
PAEs sue to recover monetary damages rather than injunctions to protect market share, 
they can strategically delay suit until alleged infringers are “locked in” to using the 
allegedly infringing technology and, thus, cannot easily switch to a non-infringing al-
ternative.  See Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. 
& TECH. L. REV. 1, 14 (2014) (“By pursuing a patent license ex post, after a product 
has been created, rather than ex ante, at the time the product is being designed, the 
patent owner can leverage not only the economic value of the invention, but also the 
cost of changing the product.”). 
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blind eye to the market entirely, a practice decried by many patentees as “hold-
out” behavior designed to raise the cost of patent enforcement.8  These con-
cerns – each among the most debated patent law issues of the last quarter cen-
tury – would see significant improvement in a world with a transparent market 
for patent rights.  However, information about patent transactions has to date 
proven hard to collect and interpret. 
Currently available information about the patent marketplace is largely 
anecdotal and qualitative in nature.  Scholars have studied market conditions 
primarily by interviewing market participants9 or conducting case studies of 
firms known to be active in the market.10  Though a few studies have collected 
quantitative data on transactions, such studies generally suffer from methodo-
logical limitations that make their findings hard to generalize.  For example, 
while several scholars have sought to study patent transactions by collecting 
patent reassignment information disclosed to the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (“PTO”),11 these studies are limited by, among other confounding fac-
tors, the fact that patent reassignments are voluntarily disclosed, that patent 
reassignments often reflect corporate mergers or name changes rather than ac-
tual sales, and that PTO records lack any information about the price paid for 
the patent.12  Other scholars have attempted to overcome these hurdles by ac-
cessing data on actual transactions, but again their studies paint at best a partial, 
 
 8. See Chien, supra note 7, at 20 (defining patent hold-out as “the practice of 
companies ignoring patents and patent demands because the high costs of enforcing 
patents make[] prosecution unlikely”). 
 9. See Kelley, supra note 1, at 117 (presenting “a current view of the patent mar-
ketplace from a practitioner’s perspective”); Ashby H. B. Monk, The Emerging Market 
for Intellectual Property: Drivers, Restrainers, and Implications, 9 J. ECON. 
GEOGRAPHY 469, 471 (2009) (presenting an analysis based on “numerous elite inter-
views with corporate executives, corporate IP lawyers, patent intermediaries and IP 
industry groups in Boston, Seattle and Silicon Valley”). 
 10. See Gary Dushnitsky & Thomas Klueter, Is There an eBay for Ideas? Insights 
from Online Knowledge Marketplaces, 8 EURO. MGMT. REV. 17 (2011) (studying thirty 
online IP marketplaces). 
 11. See Colleen V. Chien, Software Patents as a Currency, Not Tax, on Innova-
tion, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1669, 1678 (2016) (analyzing software patent transfers 
between 2012 and 2015); Alberto Galasso et al., Trading and Enforcing Patent Rights, 
44 RAND J. ECON. 275, 277 (2013) (analyzing patent transfers from individual inventors 
between 1983 and 2000); Carlos J. Serrano, The Dynamics of the Transfer and Renewal 
of Patents, 41 RAND J. ECON. 686, 690 (2010) (analyzing PTO reassignment data from 
1980 to 2001).  For similar studies analyzing transfers of non-U.S. patents, see HENRY 
CHESBROUGH, EMERGING SECONDARY MARKETS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: US 
AND JAPAN COMPARISONS 3–4 (Mar. 31, 2006), http://www.inpit.go.jp/blob/ka-
tsuyo/pdf/download/H17esm-e.pdf (comparing patent reassignment data from the 
United States and Japan); FABIAN GAESSLER & DIETMAR HARHOFF, PATENT 
TRANSFERS IN EUROPE: DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL REPORT (Sept. 4, 2016) (on file 
with authors). 
 12. See Serrano, supra note 11, at 691 (explaining that many recorded assignments 
do not represent “transaction[s] of patents across firm boundaries” and instead result 
4
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skewed picture of the market.  While a handful of studies have collected data 
on patent transactions disclosed to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”)13 or patent auctions conducted by Ocean Tomo,14 it is well known that 
these deals represent only the tip of the iceberg and, moreover, are far from 
representative of the broader market.15 
In this Article, we take advantage of Richardson Oliver Law Group’s 
(“ROL Group”) unique position as an active participant in the patent market-
place to present what we believe to be the largest and most representative em-
pirical study of the secondary market for patent rights.  Our data spans five 
years of transactions, involving almost 39,000 patent assets, an estimated 
eighty percent of all patents offered for sale on the quasi-public “brokered” 
market during the period of our study.16  For the first time, we provide near-
comprehensive statistics on the size and composition of the brokered market, 
including the types of buyers and sellers who participate in the market, the 
types of patents listed and sold on the market, and how market conditions have 
changed over time.  Our findings have importance for ongoing debates about 
how best to value patent rights, how to quantify the costs and benefits of patent 
monetization, and what impact recent changes to patent law have on companies 
with patent portfolios. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II provides background on the sec-
ondary market for patents, including the types of entities that participate in the 
market.  Part III explains our data collection methodology.  Part IV provides 
descriptive statistics that summarize what we observe in the data, and, finally, 
Part V discusses what our data can tell us about the patent system. 
 
from “administrative events, such as a name change, a security interest, a correction, 
and so on” or “transactions between inventors-employers and their employees-assign-
ees”). 
 13. Chien, supra note 11, at 1697 (studying 1431 software-related patent transac-
tions disclosed to the SEC that were sourced from ktMine); Thomas R. Varner, An 
Economic Perspective on Patent Licensing Structure and Provisions, 46 BUS. ECON. 
229, 231 (2011) (studying 1458 patent licenses and transfers disclosed to the SEC). 
 14. Cristina Odasso et al., Selling Patents at Auction: An Empirical Analysis of 
Patent Value, 24 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 417, 424–25 (2015) (studying 535 lots auc-
tioned by Ocean Tomo between 2006 and 2008); Katherine A. Sneed & Daniel K. N. 
Johnson, Selling Ideas: The Determinants of Patent Value in an Auction Environment, 
39 R&D MGMT. 87, 89 (2009) (studying 121 Ocean Tomo lots resulting in fifty-one 
sales). 
 15. Transactions disclosed to the SEC, in particular, are especially large because 
regulations require the disclosure of only those deals that are “material” to the finances 
of a publicly traded company.  See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 8-K, CURRENT 
REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 
1934, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf (requiring in Item 1.01 the disclo-
sure of “material definitive agreement[s] not made in the ordinary course of business”) 
(last visited May 22, 2018). 
 16. As we discuss infra in Part III, our coverage is higher for recent years and 
lower for earlier years. 
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II.  THE SECONDARY MARKET FOR PATENTS 
Conceptually, the market for patent rights can be divided into deals that 
license the right to use patented inventions and deals that lead to the outright 
sale of one or more patents.17  The market for patent sales can, in turn, be fur-
ther subdivided into two market segments: first, a quasi-public “brokered” mar-
ket of packages that are shopped to multiple potential buyers and, second, a 
private market of transfers that are negotiated in secret between specific par-
ties.18  Figure 1 provides a simple depiction of these market divisions. 
The first “brokered” market segment consists of patent packages that are 
offered widely to prospective buyers and thus are generally observable to in-
terested market participants, though typically subject to confidentiality agree-
ments that render the market unobservable to the public at large.19  Almost 
without exception, patents offered for sale in this quasi-public market are 
shopped by patent “brokers,”20 and for this reason we refer to it as the “bro-
kered market.”  Brokers are, in effect, the intellectual property equivalent of 
real estate agents.  They market patents on sellers’ behalf in an attempt to find 
and negotiate deals with potential buyers,21 and in return, they take a fee of 
roughly twenty percent of deals that they close.22 
 
 17. In reality, of course, many deals include both licenses and sales.  However, as 
explained in greater detail infra in Part IV.A, the quasi-public brokered market that we 
study in this paper is almost entirely limited to pure patent sales.  PTO assignment 
records suggest that roughly fourteen percent of patents change hands at least once 
before they expire.  See Serrano, supra note 11, at 693 (reporting that, across technol-
ogies, transfer rates vary between roughly twelve and sixteen percent). 
 18. Kent Richardson, Erik Oliver & Michael Costa, Inside the 2016 Brokered Pa-
tent Market, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Jan./Feb. 2017, at 34. 
 19. Kelley, supra note 1, at 135–36.  In addition to hurdles caused by confidenti-
ality obligations, even seasoned market insiders will invariably miss some portion of 
this market due to the dispersed and sometimes haphazard nature in which packages 
are circulated for sale by some brokers and sellers.  Id. 
 20. In the data that we describe infra, more than ninety-eight percent of the pack-
ages that we observe were marketed through brokers.  Fewer than two percent of patents 
were, to borrow a phrase from the real estate market, “for sale by owner.”  See also 
Richardson, Oliver & Costa, supra note 18, at 36 (reporting that at least seventy-three 
brokers represented patent sellers in 2016).  But see Kelley, supra note 1, at 121 (re-
porting that “[b]rokers facilitate three-quarters of the sales in the patent marketplace”). 
 21. In our experience, brokers often perform tasks such as selecting which patent 
assets to sell, setting asking prices, identifying potential infringement, identifying and 
contacting potential buyers, and establishing a procedure for prospective buyers’ dili-
gence and bidding.  Richardson, Oliver & Costa, supra note 18, at 35. 
 22. See Kent Richardson & Erik Oliver, Turning the Spotlight on the Brokered 
Patent Market, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Jan./Feb. 2013, at 11, 16 (reporting an average 
commission rate of twenty-two percent); Kelley, supra note 1, at 121 (reporting that 
broker commissions range between ten and twenty-five percent). 
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss2/7
2018] THE "BROKERED" MARKET FOR PATENTS 365 
Figure 1: The Market for Patent Transactions23 
 
 
Patent purchases that take place outside the brokered market are both 
harder to observe and harder to categorize.  Anecdotally, sales in this “private” 
market tend to be relatively large deals negotiated directly between buyers and 
sellers, often without the assistance of brokers.  In our experience, private sales 
are more idiosyncratic in nature and frequently are motivated by a broader set 
of considerations that extend beyond the transferred patents.  Consider for ex-
ample one deal that became public in 2014.  That year, Twitter purchased 900 
patents from IBM in a $36 million deal.  However, the parties’ agreement fol-
lowed a threat from IBM to file suit against Twitter shortly before its initial 
public offering, and the deal included cross-licensing terms in addition to the 
transfer of patents.24 
Buyers, like sellers, also participate in the patent marketplace both indi-
rectly through third parties and directly without representation.  For buyers, 
however, the division is not nearly so stark across market segments.  In both 
the private and quasi-public markets, buyers are often indirectly represented by 
patent “aggregators,” entities that are frequent purchasers and generally exist 
 
 23. This Figure is not intended to depict the relative sizes of each market subset, 
only their relationship to one another. 
 24. See, e.g., Klint Finley, Twitter Pays $36 Million to Avoid IBM Patent Suit, 
WIRED (Mar. 7, 2014, 2:42 PM), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/twitter-ibm/. 
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to facilitate coordination among multiple buyers with similar interests.25  “De-
fensive” aggregators like Allied Security Trust and RPX use a membership fee-
based model to accumulate funds that can be used to purchase patents of inter-
est to their members.26  Generally, these patents fall into one of three catego-
ries: (i) patents currently being enforced against members, (ii) patents that 
members fear may be asserted against them in court down the road, or (iii) 
patents that members wish to hold for possible defensive use against competi-
tors.  That said, some entities that have been categorized as aggregators do buy 
with monetization in mind and thus are generally also considered PAEs.27  In-
tellectual Ventures (“IV”), which owns upwards of 38,000 patents and appli-
cations,28 is undoubtedly the most famous example.  Though largely funded by 
operating technology companies like Microsoft, Intel, and Sony,29 IV’s busi-
ness model goes well beyond defensive acquisition.  In fact, it is generally un-
derstood that IV earns the “vast majority” of its revenue from licensing its port-
folio.30 
Despite the large sums of money at stake and the sophistication of many 
buyers and sellers, there remains no central clearinghouse for patent offerings.  
However, several third-party platforms play an important and increasingly 
common role in bringing potential buyers and sellers together.  For example, 
auction houses like Ocean Tomo exist to facilitate the sale of patents to the 
highest bidder.31  In addition, online platforms have arisen in an attempt to 
 
 25. See generally Sell Your Patent, RPX, https://www.rpxcorp.com/rpx-sell-your-
patent/ (last visited May 22, 2018). 
 26. Company, RPX, https://www.rpxcorp.com/about-rpx/ (last visited May 22, 
2018) (“By acquiring problem patents, RPX helps to mitigate and manage the risk of 
potential patent assertions for its growing client network.”); About Us, ALLIED 
SECURITY TRUST, http://www.ast.com/about-us/asts-mission/ (last visited May 22, 
2018) (“We are an independent member-based, not-for-profit cooperative that helps 
companies who use innovative technologies mitigate the risk of patent assertions and 
litigation by securing rights from patents available on the open market.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Erik Oliver, Kent Richardson & Michael Costa, How Intellectual 
Ventures Is Streamlining Its Portfolio, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., May/June 2016, at 9. 
 28. Id. at 10 (reporting that IV’s monetization funds collectively include 38,700 
patents); Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (2012) (reporting in 2012 that IV “has accumulated 30,000–60,000 patents 
worldwide, which would make it the 5th largest patent portfolio of any domestic US 
company and the 15th largest of any company in the world”). 
 29. See Oliver, Richardson & Costa, supra note 27, at 9 (“Since its founding, it 
has reportedly raised over $6 billion in capital.  A large portion of this has come from 
corporate investors in the high-tech space, such as Microsoft, Intel, Sony, Nokia, Apple, 
Google, Yahoo, American Express, Adobe, SAP, NVIDIA and eBay.”). 
 30. See id. (“The vast majority of IV’s revenue does not come from making prod-
ucts or offering services.  Rather, it comes from licensing its portfolio to other compa-
nies – IV is the quintessential NPE.”). 
 31. See Intellectual Property Auctions, OCEAN TOMO, http://www.ocean-
tomo.com/intellectual-property-auctions/ (last visited May 22, 2018) (explaining that 
the company conducts both “private” and “live” auctions).  Though auctions are far less 
8
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connect buyers and sellers.32  While some have failed,33 others like the new 
IAM Market34 have become quite successful.  Today, an estimated twenty-five 
percent of patents offered for sale by brokers are listed by IAM,35 and we an-
ticipate that participation in online marketplaces will continue to grow in the 
coming years. 
III.  METHODOLOGY 
To learn more about the market for patents, we set out to identify as many 
patents as possible that were offered for sale on the brokered market between 
January 1, 2012, and December 31, 2016.  To identify packages, we collected 
data from brokers as well as from online platforms.  To collect data from bro-
kers, we constructed and updated a list of known brokers and negotiated with 
each to obtain data on the patents that they offered during the period of our 
study.36  In all, we were able to obtain data covering at least some portion of 
our study period from more than 100 brokers and sellers.37  We also supple-
mented this data with listings posted to online platforms, primarily IAM Mar-
ket, to identify as many additional packages as possible. 
Though this collection procedure is imperfect, we believe that our sample 
is the most comprehensive studied to date.38  To estimate the percent of the 
brokered market that our data covers, we benchmarked our data against internal 
 
common today, at least one study estimated that about ten percent of transferred patents 
were sold via auction.  See Kelley, supra note 1, at 122 (reporting that “[t]en percent of 
the patents sold are currently sold through auctions”). 
 32. Prior to the rise of the Internet, third party publications also helped patent 
sellers spread the word about their inventions.  For example, the NEW PRODUCT 
NEWSLETTER was published from 1954 to 1997.  See, e.g., 37 INT’L NEW PRODUCT 
NEWSLETTER (Transcommunications Int’l Inc., Marblehead, Mass.), Jan. 1991, at 1 (on 
file with authors). 
 33. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, FRAND Market Failure: IPXI’s Standards-Es-
sential Patent License Exchange, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 419 (2016) (describing 
the business model, launch, and subsequent failure of the Intellectual Property Ex-
change International, Inc. (“IPXI”)). 
 34. IAM MARKET, https://www.iam-market.com/ (last visited May 22, 2018). 
 35. See Richardson, Oliver & Costa, supra note 18, at 34 (reporting that between 
October 2015 and May 2016 the IAM Market “listed 194 packages, with 3,724 assets, 
from 17 sellers”). 
 36. In each case, we were allowed access only under non-disclosure agreement 
(“NDA”), and thus unfortunately our raw data cannot be made publicly available.  We 
were successful in obtaining this data primarily because ROL Group frequently repre-
sents buyers in patent deals and, thus, brokers have a strong incentive to ensure that 
ROL Group is aware of new packages when they hit the market.  Patent Brokers, 
RICHARDSON OLIVER L. GROUP, http://www.richardsonoliver.com/brokers/ (last visited 
May 22, 2018). 
 37. A current list of active brokers is available online here: http://www.richard-
sonoliver.com/brokers. 
 38. For a summary of additional limitations to our data, see infra Part IV. 
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datasets maintained by multiple entities that operate large patent buying pro-
grams.39  Based on these benchmark comparisons, we estimate that we were 
able to observe approximately fifty-five percent of all patents placed on the 
brokered market in 2012, approximately sixty-five percent of such patents in 
2013, and approximately ninety-five percent of the brokered market in 2014, 
2015, and 2016.40 
We elected to limit our data collection to the brokered market and, thus, 
our database does not include any “private” transactions.  We did so for two 
reasons.  First, private transactions are rarely observable, and when they are, it 
is typically because they have been disclosed to the SEC.  As discussed supra, 
transactions disclosed to the SEC tend to be unusually large relative to the size 
of the disclosing party.41  In the context of private patent sales, we would expect 
the data to be biased even more so because private deals are disproportionately 
transacted between large parties, such as publicly traded technology companies 
and large aggregators.  Second, in our experience, prices in private transactions 
are typically based on information gleaned from the quasi-public brokered mar-
ket.  Because private transactions tend to be unusually large and heterogeneous, 
parties to those transactions are generally unable to use other private deals to 
conduct price comparisons.  Thus, it is our experience that the brokered market 
informs the price of patents in private transactions, but not vice versa.42 
We collected a variety of information about each package that we identi-
fied.  First, we made note of the specific assets43 included in the packages, 
including their quantity, technology classes, and (for U.S. assets) the PTO “art 
unit” in which they were examined.44  In addition, we hand coded each package 
 
 39. Unfortunately, we were only allowed to compare our respective data for the 
purposes of estimating coverage; we were not permitted to access any missing data.  In 
addition, we have agreed not to disclose the names of the entities that assisted us in 
performing this benchmark. 
 40. In the latter half of 2013, we substantially expanded our data collection efforts, 
both by increasing the number of brokers from which we collected data and by increas-
ing the number of packages we were able to review from each broker.  We believe that 
our data for 2012 and 2013 is reasonably representative of the overall brokered market 
during those years despite constituting a much smaller sample than we were able to 
obtain in later years.  As reported infra Part IV, we find a quite consistent distribution 
of package sizes, types of buyers, and patented technologies across all five years of our 
data. 
 41. See supra note 15. 
 42. Nonetheless, we are cognizant of the fact that private transactions constitute a 
large percentage, and likely the majority, of the total market for patent sales.  Extrapo-
lating from overall PTO assignment data, we believe it is reasonable to assume that the 
private market is roughly ten times larger than the brokered market.  However, in the 
technology categories that dominate our data – computer hardware, software, and tele-
communications – we estimate that about twenty to twenty-five percent of all trans-
ferred patents are sold on the brokered market. 
 43. “Assets” includes both issued patents and pending applications. 
 44. U.S. patent examiners are divided into nine “technology centers,” each of 
which is subdivided into a number of “work units” that, in turn, are further subdivided 
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as relating to one of four broad technology categories: software, hardware, 
communications, or “other.”  As discussed in greater detail below, the packages 
that we observed overwhelmingly related to computer or telecommunications 
technology.45  We also noted whether each package was circulated to potential 
buyers along with “evidence of use” (“EOU”) documentation, i.e., a document 
(sometimes in the form of a claim chart) explaining that one or more assets in 
the package may be infringed.  When an EOU was provided, we additionally 
noted the company, product, and/or technology standard that was implicated. 
When available, we also noted the asking price for the package provided 
by the seller’s broker.  As shown below in Table 2, roughly seventy-seven per-
cent of the packages that we observed were offered with some form of pricing 
guidance.  While some packages did include exact asking prices, it was more 
common for packages to indicate an anticipated range of value.  When specific 
asking prices were not provided, we estimated the asking price as the midpoint 
of the range.46 
In addition to collecting data on each package, we also identified the en-
tity attempting to sell the patent, i.e., the broker’s client.  We further classified 
each seller as an individual inventor, PAE, operating technology company, de-
fensive aggregator, or university or other research institution.  For classifica-
tion purposes, we defined a PAE as a non-practicing, for-profit entity that earns 
the majority of its revenue from patent licensing.  For operating companies, we 
additionally noted whether the company was publicly traded or privately held. 
Next, we determined to the best of our ability whether each offered pack-
age was ultimately sold.  To determine which packages sold, we searched PTO 
assignment data for all U.S. patent assets that were placed on the market.47  If 
a U.S. patent that was offered for sale was subsequently reassigned to a new 
owner,48 we assumed that the asset was successfully sold along with all other 
assets in its package.49  We conducted this search in July 2017 and made note 
 
into “art units.”  See Patent Technology Centers Management, U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patent/contact-patents/patent-technology-
centers-management (last visited May 22, 2018). 
 45. See infra Part IV.C. 
 46. Approximately two percent of packages were listed with pricing information 
that we viewed as too vague to assign a specific number.  We treat these packages as if 
they were provided without pricing information. 
 47. PTO assignment data is public and can be searched online.  Patent Assignment 
Search, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://assignment.uspto.gov/patent/in-
dex.html#/patent/search (last visited May 22, 2018). 
 48. We scrutinized the assignments to exclude those that merely represent name 
changes or mergers. 
 49. In our experience, it is extremely rare for packages to sell in pieces.  Rather 
they virtually always sell as a whole, or do not sell at all.  Nonetheless, it is possible 
that this methodology somewhat overstates the per asset sales rate. 
11
Love et al.: An Empirical Look at the "Brokered" Market for Patents
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
370 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
of all assignments dated on or before December 31, 2016.50  For two reasons 
our sales data likely understates the rate of sale.  First, patent assignments are 
voluntary and, thus, some sales may not have been recorded.51  Second, pack-
ages often sit on the market for months before they are sold and, thus, some 
packages placed on the market likely sold (or will sell) in 2017 or thereafter.52 
For packages that we identified as sold, we additionally identified the 
buyer.  As with sellers, we categorized each buyer as a PAE, operating com-
pany (public or private), defensive aggregator, individual, or university.  Fi-
nally, we determined whether any U.S. patent assets included in sold packages 
were subsequently litigated in district court or challenged before the Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”).  For those that we identified as asserted or 
challenged, we noted the date of the suit or challenge, as well as the parties 
named in the suit.  Our data on assertions and challenges is current through 
September 2017.53  As with sales, assertions often occur months after patents 
change hands.  Thus, our assertion data likely understates the true rate of liti-
gation and administrative challenge, particularly for patents placed on the mar-
ket in 2015 and 2016.54 
 
IV.  FINDINGS 
In this Part, we summarize our observations.  First, we present statistics 
on the overall market, including the number and sizes of packages placed on 
the market, the asking prices for packages on offer, the rate at which packages 
sold, and the impact that package size and documentation had on sales.  Next, 
we break the data down according to the types of entities involved in transac-
tions.  We take an especially close look at transactions involving privately held 
 
 50. Thus, our data does not include any sales that actually occurred in 2017.  We 
conducted the search in mid-2017 because sales are often recorded with the PTO weeks 
or months after they take place. 
 51. We believe that, while this is possible, it is likely a very rare occurrence.  Buy-
ers in the brokered market are mostly large, sophisticated businesses with very low risk 
tolerances. 
 52. As shown below in Figure 3, only about seventy-five percent of packages are 
sold within one year of their initial listing.  There are two other less important reasons 
that this methodology may further understate the rate of sale: some packages may have 
resulted in a partial sale that did not include a U.S. asset, and a small number of ob-
served packages did not include any U.S. assets.  In our experience, the former is highly 
unlikely.  While it is common for prices to reflect a small number of assets among the 
many included in a package, packages virtually always sell as a whole.  With respect 
to the latter, fewer than four percent of observed packages did not include at least one 
issued U.S. patent. 
 53. We collected litigation and PTAB data by searching Docket Navigator for each 
sold U.S. patent.  See DOCKET NAVIGATOR, https://www.docketnavigator.com (last vis-
ited May 22, 2018). 
 54. As shown below in Table 9, packages that were litigated were, on average, 
enforced in court about 187 days after they were purchased. 
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operating companies, PAEs, and universities.  Finally, we present statistics on 
transactions across technologies and take a closer look at the market for certain 
types of patents, including those claiming business methods. 
A.  Overall Market Statistics 
We begin with an overview of all observed packages that were offered 
for sale between 2012 and 2016.  Table 1 below presents data on the quantity 
and sizes of these packages. 
 



































































































First, we find that asset packages are almost without exception made up 
exclusively of issued patents and pending patent applications.  Less than one 
percent of the packages that we observed included another type of IP right or 
some form of know-how.  Those rare packages that did include non-patent as-
sets overwhelmingly listed a trademark (thirteen of seventeen packages).  
 
 55. Our estimated totals assume that we observed fifty-five percent of the total 
brokered market in 2012, sixty-five percent in 2013, and ninety-five percent in 2014, 
2015, and 2016.  As discussed supra at notes 39–40, these coverage estimates are de-
rived from comparing our data with data accumulated by other large market partici-
pants. 
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Three or fewer packages offered to transfer source code, a domain name, or 
some form of trade secret, like a customer list.56 
On average, the packages we observed also consist primarily of issued 
U.S. patents.  This is not surprising because, in our experience, it is usually 
U.S. patent assets that drive sales.57  The United States is one of the largest 
technology markets in the world,58 as well as one of the most litigious,59 and 
both of these facts tend to increase the importance and value of U.S. patent 
rights.  In our experience, buyers are also attracted to U.S. patents due to the 
availability of important information about them.  Compared to patent offices 
in other parts of the world, the PTO makes a relatively large amount of data 
available to the public.60  As a result, it is easier for buyers to perform due 
 
 56. Feldman and Lemley make a similar finding in a study of licensing offers made 
by patentees to technology companies.  See Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do 
Patent Licensing Demands Mean Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137, 153, 158 (2015) 
(finding that respondents in a survey of in-house counsel at technology companies over-
whelmingly reported that patentee-initiated licenses led to the transfer of “[t]echnical 
[k]nowledge in addition to the [p]atent [l]icense” between “0-10%” whether or not the 
patentee was an NPE, university, or operating technology company).  On the other 
hand, studies of patent transactions reported to the SEC have consistently found that at 
least some transactions include other IP assets or know-how.  See Varner, supra note 
13, at 232 (finding in a study of more than 1400 patent transactions reported to the SEC 
that fifty-six percent included know-how in addition to the license or sale). 
 57. This, of course, is not always true.  For example, German patents are also 
highly sought after by many buyers, likely due to the jurisdiction’s high grant rate for 
injunctions and bifurcation of infringement and validity determinations.  See Katrin 
Cremers et al., Invalid but Infringed? An Analysis of the Bifurcated Patent Litigation 
System, 131 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 218, 219 (2016). 
 58. For example, on a per capita basis, a patentee would have to obtain and enforce 
patent rights in at least five European countries to match the jurisdictional reach of one 
patent suit in the United States.  See, e.g., Population, Total, WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL (last visited May 22, 2018) (show-
ing that the U.S. population is roughly 323 million, approximately equal to that of 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom combined). 
 59. Compared to the United States, which has seen more than 4000 patent suits 
filed each year since 2012, Cases Filed by Year, LEX MACHINA, https://law.lexmach-
ina.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2018), other nations see relatively few suits, see Brian J. 
Love et al., Patent Assertion Entities in Europe, in PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES AND 
COMPETITION POLICY 104, 107 (D. Daniel Sokol ed., 2017) (reporting that there were 
less than 100 patent suits filed in the United Kingdom in twelve out of fourteen years 
during the period 2000–2013, and that there were less than 600 patent suits filed in 
Germany in eight out of nine years during the period 2000–2008). 
 60. In addition to existing databases like Pubic Patent Application Information 
Retrieval (“PAIR”), Patent Application Information Retrieval, U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF., http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (last visited May 22, 2018), 
the USPTO recently released multiple relational databases of U.S. patent-related data 
for free, bulk download by the public.  See PATENTS VIEW, http://www.patentsview.org 
(last visited May 22, 2018); Patent Examination Research Dataset (Public PAIR), U.S. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/electronic-
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diligence on U.S. patent assets.  For some types of foreign assets, it can even 
be difficult to determine whether a particular patent has expired or was aban-
doned, let alone to obtain and scrutinize its prosecution history.  Thus, for the 
sake of efficiency (if not out of necessity) potential buyers often assess pack-
ages by focusing on the U.S. patent assets first and only reviewing the interna-
tional counterparts later.  Accordingly, buyers typically view the U.S. patents 
in a package as the primary source of value, as well as a proxy for the value of 
any related foreign assets in the package. 
Looking across the period of our study, we see a general increase in the 
number of packages offered each year.  Though the increase in our raw data is 
partly an artifact of our collection methodology, we see a roughly fifty percent 
increase even after correcting for improvement over time in our market cover-
age.  That said, package sizes have remained relatively stable and, if anything, 
have generally trended downward in recent years.  In short, from a high-level 
perspective what we see is a trend toward more, but smaller, packages. 
Looking closer at statistics on package size, we also see that each year’s 
mean exceeds its median.  As that suggests, we observed a small number of 
particularly large packages in each year that we studied.  However, as shown 
below in Figure 2, most packages offered on the brokered market were quite 
small.  More than two thirds of the packages listed during the period of our 
study contained ten or fewer total assets, and about half included five or fewer 
assets.61  Though sales of large portfolios receive the most public attention, 




data-products/patent-examination-research-dataset-public-pair (last visited May 22, 
2018); Patent Assignment Search, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://assign-
ment.uspto.gov/patent/index.html#/patent/search (last visited May 22, 2018). 
 61. The distribution of package sizes that we observed was also quite consistent 
across the period of our study. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Brokered Packages by Number of Assets 
 
 
Of the 2605 total packages that we observed during the period of our 
study, approximately seventy-seven percent were presented with an (at least 
approximate) asking price.  As shown below in Table 2, the use of pricing 
guidance has dropped in recent years.  However, we do not believe that this 
reflects a change in seller behavior but rather is an artifact of the increased 
importance of IAM Market, which does not require sellers to post pricing in-
formation.  Excluding packages collected from IAM, we collected pricing data 
for approximately eighty-four percent of packages. 
We do, however, observe a steep drop in asking prices, particularly when 
prices are viewed relative to the number of U.S. assets they contain.  On one 
hand, the drop in prices likely reflects to some extent the general increase in 
supply of packages that we observed above.  On the other, the thirty percent 
drop in median per-U.S.-asset asking prices that we observed seems unlikely 
to be purely endogenous.  One possible explanation is that the decline in prices 
reflects recent substantive and procedural changes to U.S. patent law, espe-
cially the introduction of new administrative procedures for challenging issued 
patents62 and the Supreme Court’s tightening of the scope of patentable subject 
 
 62. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011) (codified in various sections of Title 35) (“AIA”), established new procedures 
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matter.63  Then again, we also find that the market grew in 2016, exceeding 
both 2014 and 2015 pricing levels.  This observation is arguably more difficult 
to explain but may likewise reflect the dissipation of initial uncertainty about 
the long-term impact of the very same changes to the law that caused prices to 
dip in the two years prior.  We investigate both hypotheses below when we 
examine the market for software and business method patents.64  
 
for challenging the validity of issued patents in administrative “trials” before the PTO’s 
PTAB.  Since these procedures went into effect in September 2012, more than 8000 
petitions for PTAB review have been filed.  See PTAB Overview, UNIFIED PATENTS, 
https://portal.unifiedpatents.com (last visited May 22, 2018).  For a comparison of the 
efficacy of post-grant review procedures before and after the AIA, see Brian J. Love & 
Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. 
REV. DIALOGUE 93, 105 (2014) (concluding that, compared to their predecessors, post 
grant proceedings established by the AIA “result in the elimination of every challenged 
claim about twice as often, reach a final decision almost twice as quickly, and make 
accused infringers almost twice as likely to win motions to stay co-pending litigation”). 
 63. For a brief summary of the evolution of case law defining the bounds of pa-
tentable subject matter in the United States, see U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER: REPORT ON VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM 
THE PUBLIC 1 (July 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/101-
Report_FINAL.pdf (“Between 2010 and 2014, the United States Supreme Court issued 
four decisions (Bilski, Mayo, Myriad, and Alice) that shifted the dividing line between 
eligible and ineligible subject matter.”). 
 64. See infra Part IV.C. 
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2012 199 155 (77.9%) $283 ($200) $471 ($325) 
2013 377 331 (87.8%) $275 ($185) $382 ($313) 
2014 657 564 (85.8%) $196 ($148) $275 ($200) 
2015 709 499 (70.4%) $174 ($121) $256 ($167) 
2016 663 446 (67.3%) $193 ($150) $267 ($231) 
Total 2,605 1,995 (76.6%) $210 ($150) $302 ($231) 
 
Based on our analysis of PTO assignment records, we estimate that close 
to one quarter of the packages that we observed changed hands before the end 
of 2016.67  As shown below in Table 3, about thirty to forty percent of packages 
listed between 2012 and 2014 ultimately sold during the period of our study.  
Though the figures reported for packages listed in 2015 and 2016 are consid-
erably lower, this drop is explained in large part by the fact that packages often 
sell many months after they are initially listed.  As shown in Figure 3, roughly 
thirty percent of sales that we observed took place more than one year after 
listing and about ten percent were completed more than two years later.  That 
said, sales rates do seem to have fallen over time.  We project that about twenty-
one percent of packages listed in 2015 and twenty-two percent of 2016 pack-
ages will ultimately sell. 
Though we are generally unable to observe sales prices, we are nonethe-
less able to roughly estimate them, at least in the aggregate.  To approximate 
the correlation between asking and sales prices, we obtained actual pricing data 
 
 65. As mentioned supra, the drop in pricing guidance shown in this column is 
largely the result of the rise in popularity of IAM Market.  Excluding packages listed 
on IAM Market, we received pricing information for about eighty-four percent of all 
packages listed in 2015 and 2016. 
 66. Here and throughout (unless stated otherwise), the “averages” that we report 
are “five percent trimmed means” that omit the highest and lowest five percent of 
prices.  This methodology produces more meaningful information because our pricing 
data includes several extreme outliers.  See, e.g., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
QUANTITATIVE METHODS: FOUNDATIONS 395–96 (Todd D. Little ed., 2013) (defining 
“trimmed mean” and explaining that “[o]ne major advantage of the trimmed mean . . . 
is that it is more resistant to outliers. . . [and thus] can make it easier to detect genuine 
differences among groups”). 
 67. As discussed supra, there are a number of reasons to believe that our sales 
statistics understate the actual sales rate to some extent.  See supra notes 51–52. 
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for what we believe to be a reasonably representative sample of 120 deals com-
pleted by six companies.68  In that sample, we observed that, on average, pack-
ages actually sold for about sixty-five percent of their asking price.  The data 
presented in Table 3 below extrapolates this estimate to all packages that we 
identified as sold.69 
Much like the asking prices discussed above, we estimate that per-asset 
sales prices fell during the period of our study with a steady decline each year 
through 2015 followed by a substantial increase in 2016.  Overall, we find a 
roughly thirty-five percent decline in estimated per-asset prices paid for pack-
ages that were listed in 2016 compared to those that were listed in 2012.  How-
ever, we also estimate that sales prices fell a much more modest five to ten 




 68. Again, we obtained this data under NDA and unfortunately cannot share the 
raw sales data nor disclose the names of the companies that assisted us in performing 
this pricing analysis.  The entities that shared pricing data with us are a mixture of large 
operating companies and defensive aggregators, and the specific transactions that we 
analyzed overwhelmingly involved patents covering software and/or hardware related 
to information and communication technologies.  As discussed infra in Parts IV.B and 
IV.C, operating companies and aggregators collectively account for about sixty percent 
of all brokered purchases, and almost ninety percent of all packages offered on the 
brokered market cover software, hardware, or communications technologies. 
 69. In other words, in the sales data reported in Table 3, we assume that packages 
sold (on average) for sixty-five percent of their asking price.  To be clear, this estimate 
is unlikely to be accurate for any individual package.  However, on average over a large 
group of packages, we believe it is reasonably accurate.  See infra Table 3. 
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Figure 3: Time to Sale 
 
To learn more about which package characteristics impact sales, we ad-
ditionally investigated the effect of package size and EOU documentation.  Ta-
 
 70. The sales figures in this column reflect only those sales recorded by December 
31, 2016.  As discussed supra, many sales are recorded more than one year after the 
sold package was first listed; thus, our sales data for 2015 and 2016 likely underreport 
the eventual number of sales by about four and sixteen percentage points, respectively.   
 71. As discussed supra, these statistics were calculated by discounting the asking 
price of sold packages by thirty-five percent.   
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ble 4 presents our sales data broken down by package size.  We see little cor-
relation between package size and likelihood of sale.  Overall, the size distri-
bution of sold packages closely matches the size distribution of listed packages, 
which suggests to us that buyers have no clear preference for packages of a 
particular size. 
On the other hand, we do observe a strong negative correlation between 
package size and average price paid per asset.  While this decline in marginal 
prices likely reflects a volume discount to some extent, we believe that it also 
results from the fact that many sales are driven by interest in just a small num-
ber of included assets. 
 
Table 4: Effect of Package Size 
  
 
 72. Hereinafter, all annual sales figures reflect sales (recorded before December 
31, 2016) of patents that were listed for sale in the indicated year, not all sales that took 
place during the indicated year (regardless of when the purchased patent was listed).  
Thus, for example, the data in the first three rows of the adjacent column is meant to 
communicate: (i) that eighteen percent of all packages listed in 2012 included a single 
asset, (ii) that twenty-one percent of all packages listed in 2012 that sold before De-
cember 31, 2016, included a single asset, and (iii) that the average price paid for single-
asset packages listed in 2012 (but sold any time before December 31, 2016) was about 
$331,000. 
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As shown below in Table 5, about thirty-seven percent of the packages 
that we observed were circulated along with EOUs.  This practice is yet another 
reason to believe that the sale of many packages is driven by interest in just a 
fraction of the included assets.  An EOU is intended to convince potential buy-
ers that the technology covered by at least one asset in the package is incorpo-
rated in a popular product, and the EOUs that we observed virtually always 
focused on one asset (or one family of assets), even when the offered package 
itself was quite large. 
Moreover, our data suggests that EOUs are important to buyers.  Packages 
listed with EOUs were disproportionately likely to sell and, in addition, appear 
to have sold at a premium.  Overall, we estimate that packages with EOUs 
commanded per-asset prices that were about fourteen percent higher than those 
paid for packages without some evidence of use. 
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Table 5: Effect of EOUs 
 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
2012
-16 
Packages with EOU 
   % of Listed 
   % of Sold73 
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Table 6 lists the companies most often mentioned in the EOUs that we 
observed.  Perhaps not surprisingly, they are among the largest and highest 
grossing technology companies in the world.  They are also among those sued 
most often for patent infringement.  On the whole, we see little evidence that 
EOUs are meant to convey that implementing patented technologies would be 
valuable for buyers.  Rather, it is our experience that EOUs are intended to 
demonstrate that assets in the package could be asserted in a lucrative lawsuit 
or licensing negotiation.  This also tends to support our conclusion that sales 
are typically driven by just a fraction of included assets because, as a practical 





 73. See supra note 72. 
 74. See Jonathan H. Ashtor et al., Patents at Issue: The Data Behind the Patent 
Troll Debate, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 957, 958 (2014) (finding that patentees asserted 
two to four patents per lawsuit on average between 1995 and 2011). 
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 Annual Revenue 
($B) 
No. U.S. Patent Cases 
in Which Named as 
Def. (2012-16)75 
1. Google (171) $90.376 142 
2. Apple (164) $215.8 268 
3. Microsoft (132) $92.1 151 
4. Samsung (116) $175.577 271 
5. Cisco (74) $49.2 71 
6. Facebook (57) $27.6 65 
7. Amazon (51) $136.0 51 
8. Oracle (46) $37.0 35 
 
Finally, we estimate the size of the annual brokered market.  Correcting 
for gaps in our data’s coverage, we estimate that the brokered market for patent 
sales exceeded $225 million per year.  As with both asking and sales prices, 
our estimates suggest that the overall market dropped in recent years before 
rebounding in 2016.  Though it is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the 
total amount patentees collect each year in licensing revenue and lawsuit set-
tlements, we think it is fair to say that these annual totals fall below three per-
 
 75. We collected this data by searching Lex Machina for all patent cases in which 
each company (or one of its subsidiaries) was named as a defendant.  See Cases Filed 
by Year, supra note 59. 
 76. Revenue for Google’s parent Alphabet, Inc.  Annual Revenue of Alphabet from 
2011 to 2017 (in Million U.S. dollars), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statis-
tics/507742/alphabet-annual-global-revenue/ (last visited May 22, 2018). 
 77. 201.9 trillion KRW.  For conversion of currency rates, see XE Currency Con-
verter: USD to KRW, XE, http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/con-
vert/?Amount=1&From=USD&To=KRW (last visited May 22, 2018). 
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cent of annual revenue derived from U.S. patent litigation (including both set-
tlements and damages awards)78 and, moreover, constitute less than one per-
cent of all revenue earned annually worldwide from patent licenses and sales.79 
 








B.  Buyers and Sellers 
 
Next, we look at the types of entities that participate in the brokered mar-
ket.  We compare the sales and purchasing activities of various kinds of market 
participants and also examine more closely the behavior of privately owned 
operating companies, PAEs, and universities. 
 
 78. A survey conducted by RPX in 2012 placed the average settlement amount for 
U.S. patent suits filed by NPEs at $1.33 million per case for small companies and $7.27 
million for large companies.  See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs 
from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 400 (2014).  Moreover, there were an 
average of 5409 U.S. patent cases filed each year between 2012 and 2016.  See Cases 
Filed by Year, supra note 59.  Further, according to Lex Machina, district courts 
awarded a total of about $15 billion in patent damages awards between 2000 and 2013, 
OWEN BYRD ET AL., LEX MACHINA PATENT LITIGATION DAMAGES REPORT 1 (2014) (on 
file with authors) (reporting that during the period 2000–2013 U.S. courts awarded a 
total of $15.4 billion in damages, fees, and costs in patent suits), though many of these 
awards were subsequently overturned or reduced on appeal.  Roughly speaking, these 
figures safely place the annual revenue that patentees earned from U.S. patent litigation 
above $8 billion. 
 79. As cited above, existing estimates of the average total revenue earned from 
patent transactions range from about $35 billion to $100 billion.  See supra note 3. 
 80. Because sales often take place well after a package is listed, a large portion of 
sales that took place in 2012 and 2013 likely involved packages that were listed in 2010 
and 2011, before we began collecting data.  Thus, we lack sufficient evidence to esti-
mate the size of the entire market in 2012 and 2013. 
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First, as shown below in Figure 4, we find that the majority of packages 
sold were listed by product-producing technology companies.  In each year that 
we studied, operating companies were responsible for the majority of listed 
packages and, overall, operating companies listed about two thirds of all sold 
packages that we observed. 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Sellers by Entity Type81 
 
Looking at other types of sellers, we observe two noteworthy trends.  
First, the percentage of packages sold by individual inventors dropped consid-
erably – by more than fifty percent – during the period of our study.  At the 
same time, the percentage of packages sold by PAEs increased by a factor of 
four.  Though our data cannot say for sure, we do not believe that these trends 
are (directly) related.82  We suspect that the decline in individual sellers reflects 
the general decline in prices discussed above.  Because individuals typically 
offer especially small packages and enter the market on a one-time basis, they 
are likely more sensitive to declining prices than repeat sellers with higher vol-
umes.  We believe that the increase in sales by PAEs may result from decreas-
ing returns to patent assertion following, for example, the introduction of new 
post-grant patent proceedings in late 201283 and the Supreme Court’s 2014 
 
 81. The “Other” category includes law firms, trusts, religious organizations, and 
packages for which we were unable to determine the owner. 
 82. For example, we do not believe that PAEs are increasingly re-selling patents 
privately sourced from individuals. 
 83. To date, almost 3600 PTAB petitions have been filed challenging NPE-owned 




y%29&up_entity=NPE+%28Individual%29 (last visited May 22, 2018).  Moreover, 
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opinion in Alice v. CLS Bank.84  PAEs that purchased patents in years past may 
now be looking to unload assets that, in today’s litigation environment, are in-
sufficiently profitable. 
We also observe that different types of sellers tend to list different types 
of packages.  Not surprisingly, we see that individuals sell the smallest pack-
ages, while operating technology companies sell the largest.  We also see var-
iation in pricing across different types of sellers.  Patents sold by individuals 
and PAEs sell at disproportionately high prices, which may support our suspi-
cions about the reasons for their respective decline and rise in the market.  In-
dividuals with all but the most promising packages may be deterred by the cost 
of entering the market, while PAEs may be looking to re-sell patents that, while 
relatively less valuable today, were nonetheless carefully vetted for high value 
in years past and retain much of that value.85  Interestingly, packages offered 
by universities sold for the lowest prices of any group.  While this may reflect 
the fact that universities are non-profit institutions that (ideally) engage in tech-
nology transfer with more than sheer profitability in mind, it may also reflect 
 
NPE-owned patents have been both instituted and (at least partially) cancelled by the 
PTAB at higher rates than patents owned by operating tech companies.  See id. 
 84. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).  The Court’s 
decision in Alice substantially (and retroactively) narrowed the scope of patentability 
for software-implemented algorithms, an outcome that left many existing software-re-
lated patents vulnerable to attack.  See Robert R. Sachs, AliceStorm Update for Q1 
2017, BILSKIBLOG (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2017/04/alicestorm-
update-for-q1-2017.html (reporting that, post-Alice, sixty-seven percent of patentable 
subject matter decisions issued by U.S. courts – 317 out of 473 total decisions through 
March 2017 – at least partially invalidated the patent(s)-at-issue).  This development 
disproportionately impacts PAEs because PAEs assert software patents more often than 
other patentees.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 22 (Aug. 2013), 
http://1.usa.gov/1gatCRr (“Specifically, about 84 percent of [PAE] lawsuits from 2007 
to 2011 involved software-related patents, while about 35 percent of operating com-
pany lawsuits did . . . . By defendant, software-related patents were used to sue 93 
percent of the defendants in [PAE] suits and 46 percent of the defendants in operating 
company suits . . . .”). 
 85. At least one study found that patents acquired by PAEs were of higher quality, 
at least as measured by forward citations, than patents acquired by other purchasers.  
See Timo Fischer & Joachim Henkel, Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology – An 
Empirical Analysis of NPEs’ Patent Acquisitions, 41 RES. POL’Y 1519, 1526 (2012) 
(“NPEs acquire patents that, on average, lie in denser technology fields, received more 
forward citations, have more claims, are older, and lie in more crowded technology 
fields than patents acquired by practicing firms.”). 
27
Love et al.: An Empirical Look at the "Brokered" Market for Patents
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
386 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
that university patents are of relatively low quality86 or that universities are less 















 86. Some studies have linked increased patenting by universities with a decrease 
in overall university patent quality.  See Rebecca Henderson et al., Universities as a 
Source of Commercial Technology: A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting, 1965–
1988, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 119 (1998) (finding that university patent quality, as 
measured by citation analysis, declined dramatically following enactment of the Bayh-
Dole Act); Christos Kolympiris & Peter G. Klein, The Effects of Academic Incubators 
on University Innovation, 11 STRATEGIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP J. 145 (2017) (finding that 
the quality of university patents is negatively correlated with the establishment of a 
university-affiliated startup incubator).  However, other studies have called these find-
ings into question.  See Bhaven N. Sampat et al., Changes in University Patent Quality 
After the Bayh-Dole Act: A Re-Examination, 21 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1371, 1388 (2003) 
(explaining that Henderson et al.’s findings may reflect “truncation bias” due to their 
citation data covering an insufficiently long period of time). 
 87. For example, multiple studies have found that universities tend to lose money 
on their patent holdings, see Brian J. Love, Do University Patents Pay Off? Evidence 
from a Survey of University Inventors in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, 
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 285, 313 (2014) (estimating based on a survey of university 
professors of electrical engineering and computer science at highly ranked U.S. univer-
sities that these universities collectively lost money pursuing “high tech” patents); 
WALTER D. VALDIVIA, UNIVERSITY START-UPS: CRITICAL FOR IMPROVING 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 9 (Nov. 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/06/Valdivia_Tech-Transfer_v29_No-Embargo.pdf (estimating that 130 of 
155 surveyed universities lost money on their patent programs in 2012). 
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Table 8: Sales Data by Seller Entity Type 
 
 
While sellers come in many shapes and sizes, buyers are a more uniform 
group.  As with listed packages, the majority of purchased packages are ac-
quired by product-producing technology companies.  As shown below in Fig-
ure 5, operating companies (acting in their own capacity) make up the largest 
subset of buyers.  Collectively, they buy about forty percent of packages that 
sell.  Defensive aggregators purchase an additional twenty percent of brokered 
patents on behalf of their operating company members.  Virtually all of the 
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Figure 5: Buyers by Entity Type88 
 
 
While we saw a good deal of variation in price and package size among 
sellers, we see far less variation among types of buyers.  PAEs and defensive 
aggregators, in particular, paid similar per-asset prices for packages of similar 
sizes.  On average, the two groups of buyers have virtually identical statistics.  
By comparison, operating companies bought somewhat larger packages for 
somewhat lower per-asset prices. 
Turning to litigation data, we see that purchased patents are frequently 
litigated when purchased by PAEs but very rarely litigated when acquired by 
operating companies.  One third of patent packages purchased by PAEs in-
cluded at least one U.S. patent that was asserted89 after the sale’s completion.  
By contrast, only about three percent of packages purchased by operating com-
panies and defensive aggregators90 included a later-asserted patent.  Overall, 
 
 88. The “other” category includes five individuals, two universities, one law firm, 
and nine buyers that we were unable to identify. 
 89. In the charts that follow we report statistics for packages including at least one 
asset that was either enforced in a patent infringement case filed in a U.S. court or 
challenged in a petition filed with the PTAB.  We include patents that were challenged 
in a PTAB petition, but not litigated in federal court, in our statistics because it is our 
experience that such challenges often follow a threat of assertion made out of court.  
That said, this decision does not have a significant impact on our results.  Only four 
packages (out of the seventy-eight total litigated or challenged) included an asset that 
had been challenged before PTAB but not an asset that was asserted in court. 
 90. We observed that a total of two packages purchased by defensive aggregators 
were later litigated in U.S. court.  However, these packages were not in fact litigated 
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PAEs purchased eighty-three percent of packages that were asserted at least 
once in U.S. court post-sale.  Moreover, PAEs filed suit more quickly, waiting 
on average only about five months before filing suit.  Patents purchased by 
operating companies and defensive aggregators were asserted much later, on 
average well over a year after purchase. 
  
 
by the aggregators themselves.  Rather, these packages were purchased, licensed to the 
aggregators’ members, and then re-sold to PAEs that asserted them later. 
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Table 9: Sales and Assertion Data by Buyer Entity Type 
 
 91. As in Figure 5, supra, the “other” category includes individuals, universities, 
a law firm, and a few buyers that we were unable to identify.  Because these groups are 
individually very small, and collectively very heterogeneous, we have omitted their 
statistics from Table 9. 
 92. See supra note 90.  Both packages were actually enforced by PAEs to which 
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To learn more about parties’ motivations for buying and selling, we also 
took a closer look at various subsets of buyers and sellers, including those that 
are most active in the market, operating companies that have not yet gone pub-
lic, PAEs, and universities.  Table 10 below shows the top ten most frequent 
buyers and sellers in the brokered market.  The two groups make for an inter-
esting comparison.  The top sellers are, by and large, established incumbents.  
AT&T, IBM, Xerox, and Alcatel Lucent have each been in business for well 
over a century, and Panasonic isn’t too far behind.93  Though responsible for 
some of the most important innovations of the twentieth century,94 these firms 
have since largely moved away from manufacturing and today make a good 
deal of their revenue from selling patent rights instead of products.95 
 
 93. AT&T’s predecessors date back to 1875.  A Brief History: Origins, AT&T, 
https://www.corp.att.com/history/history1.html (last visited May 22, 2018).  IBM was 
founded in 1911.  IBM Is Founded, IBM, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/his-
tory/ibm100/us/en/icons/founded/ (last visited May 22, 2018).  Xerox’s predecessor 
was founded in 1906.  Always Moving. Making History for More Than 100 Years, 
XEROX, https://www.xerox.com/about-xerox/history-timeline/1950-decade/enus.html 
(last visited May 22, 2018).  And both Alcatel and Lucent have predecessors that date 
back to the nineteenth century.  Alcatel-Lucent History, NOKIA, https://www.noki 
a.com/en_int/about-us/who-we-are/our-history (last visited May 22, 2018). 
 94. For example, scientists and engineers working at Bell Labs, which was estab-
lished by AT&T and later spun off to Lucent, played a central role in the invention of 
many revolutionary technologies, including the transistor and laser.  See, e.g., JOHN 
GERTNER, THE IDEA FACTORY: BELL LABS AND THE GREAT AGE OF AMERICAN 
INNOVATION 255 (2012).  Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center (“PARC”) also played a 
crucial role in the development of many personal computing technologies, including 
laser printing, the graphical user interface, and the mouse.  See, e.g., MICHAEL HILTZIK, 
DEALERS OF LIGHTNING: XEROX PARC AND THE DAWN OF THE COMPUTER AGE (1999). 
 95. For example, IBM sold its personal computer division to Lenovo in 2005, as 
well as its x86 server division in 2014.  Stephen Shankland, IBM Sells Its x86 Server 
Business to Lenovo for $2.3 Billion, CNET (Jan. 23, 2014, 2:33 AM), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/ibm-sells-its-x86-server-business-to-lenovo-for-2-3-bil-
lion/.  IBM’s revenues also fell every year during the period of our study.  How IBM 
Makes Money? Understanding IBM Business Model, REVENUE & PROFITS, http://reve-
nuesandprofits.com/how-ibm-makes-money/ (last visited May 22, 2018).  Similarly, 
Xerox recently split into two separate companies after “annual revenue and net income 
decline[d] every year going back to at least 2011, dropping roughly $2.5 billion in total 
revenues from 2011–2015.”  Todd Clausen, Xerox Completes Split into 2 Companies, 
USA TODAY (Jan. 3, 2017 1:00 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/nation-
now/2017/01/03/xerox-conduent-split-complete/96110370/.  Alcatel-Lucent merged 
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The group of top buyers is a bit more diverse.  It is made up of three 
defensive aggregators, three PAEs, and four frequent targets of patent asser-
tion.96  Though different in many respects, these buyers all share an acute in-
terest in the litigation value of the patents they purchased: the PAEs for pur-
poses of revenue generation and the others for risk mitigation.  Compared to 
sellers, operating companies on this side of the ledger are much younger and 
much more heavily invested in producing goods and services (relative to li-
censing). 
 
Table 10: Top 10 Sellers and Buyers 
 
Rank97 Sellers Rank Buyers 
1. AT&T 1. RPX Corp. 
2. PARC (Xerox) 2. Intellectual Ventures 
3. Panasonic Corp. 3. Allied Security Trust 
4. Verizon  
Communications, Inc. 
4. Google, Inc. 
5. Cypress Semi. Corp. 5. Knapp Investment Co. 
6. Alcatel Lucent 5. Rakuten, Inc. 
6. IBM 7. Apple, Inc. 
8. Allied Security Trust 7. LinkedIn Corp. 
8. Hewlett Packard Enter. 9. Intellectual Discovery Co., 
Ltd. 
8. Huawei Tech. Co. Ltd. 9. Open Innovation Network, 
LLC 
8. Intel Corp.   
 
To learn more about the market activity of larger and smaller companies, 
we compared the activities of public and private operating companies.  As 
 
Work, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2016, 7:06 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nokia-al-
catel-lucent-set-to-put-merger-to-work-1451896364. 
 96. As shown in Table 6, Apple and Google were collectively sued more than 400 
times for patent infringement during the period 2012 to 2016.  RPX reports that, during 
the same period, Rakuten (or one of its subsidiaries) was sued for patent infringement 
fifty-five times and LinkedIn thirty-six times.  RPX INSIGHT, https://insight.rpx-
corp.com/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2018).  For a unique look into the defensive calculations 
behind LinkedIn’s patent purchases during this period, see Sara Harrington, Pierre Kee-
ley, Kent Richardson & Erik Oliver, How and Why LinkedIn Learned to Love Patents, 
INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Mar./Apr. 2017, at 26, 26 (“In 2012 LinkedIn found itself a 
potential target for corporate patent asserters.  It had revenue reaching nearly $1 billion, 
with growth of 86%, yet owned only 22 patents.  However, this changed fundamentally 
from 2012 to mid-2016, when LinkedIn grew its organic portfolio from 36 to over 1,000 
patent assets and purchased more than 900, dramatically reducing its risk profile.”). 
 97. The rankings reported in this table are based on the total number of packages 
sold or purchased, respectively. 
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shown below in Table 11, both groups sold a similar number of packages dur-
ing the period of our study and made a similar proportion of their sales to other 
types of market participants.  However, public companies purchased about 
three times as many packages as privately-owned firms.  On one hand, this data 
is consistent with the traditional narrative that patents help early stage compa-
nies transfer technology to larger firms that are better positioned to bring a 
product to market.  Indeed, we see more than twice as many packages moving 
from private to public companies as we see moving in the opposite direction.98  
However, we otherwise see little evidence that the brokered market directly 
facilitates technology transfer. 
Instead, we suspect that the differences we see in buying activity are 
largely explained by the relative likelihood that public and private firms will 
be sued for patent infringement.  Private companies tend to be younger and 
smaller and, thus, generally make less attractive targets for patent suits.  Con-
sequently, they have less incentive to build a defensive portfolio or preemp-
tively acquire patents that might otherwise wind up in the hands of a competitor 
or PAE.  Additionally, it is our anecdotal experience that private companies 
selling patents are disproportionately likely to be doing so because they are in 
extreme financial straits, if not already in the process of winding down their 























 98. This finding stands somewhat in contrast to Chien’s finding that transfers of 
software patents tend to go from older, larger, and higher-earning (public) companies 
to younger, newer, lower-earning (public) companies.  See Chien, supra note 11, at 
1707. 
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Table 11: Private vs. Public Operating Companies 
 




Num. Packages Sold 194 159 
Num. (%) Sold to 
Pub. Op. Cos. 
82 (42%) 42 (26%) 
Num. (%) Sold to 
Priv. Op. Cos. 
17 (9%) 21 (13%) 
Num. (%) Sold to 
Def. Aggregators 
27 (14%) 37 (23%) 
Num. (%) Sold to 
PAEs 
67 (35%) 53 (33%) 
Num. Packages  
Purchased 
169 56 
Num. (%) Purchased 
from Pub. Op. Cos. 
82 (49%) 17 (30%) 
Num. (%) Purchased 
from Priv. Op. Cos. 
42 (25%) 21 (38%) 
Num. (%) Purchased 
from Def.  
Aggregators 
6 (4%) 1 (2%) 
Num. (%) Purchased 
from PAEs 
18 (11%) 8 (14%) 
 
Turning next to a closer examination of deals involving PAEs, we see that 
operating companies are not just the largest source overall of offered patents 
but also the largest source of assets purchased by PAEs.  In addition, we ob-
serve that packages listed by publicly traded operating companies – the subset 
of patentees that should possess the most experience with patent assertion – are 
the source of about one third of packages that PAEs purchased on the brokered 
market during the period of our study.  Privately held companies and individ-
uals, the two groups that we would expect to benefit the most from PAEs’ ex-
pertise in patent assertion,99 sold fewer packages to PAEs, accounting for about 
twenty-seven and eighteen percent respectively of PAEs’ purchases. 
 
 
 99. One potential benefit of PAEs is that they serve as enforcement specialists.  
See Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAES), 99 
MINN. L. REV. 649, 653 (2014) (noting that “[d]efenders of PAEs have offered several 
purported benefits” including that “PAEs are claimed to be specialists in patent en-
forcement who are skilled in evaluating allegations of infringement and  hiring  and  
supervising  law  firms  to  keep  costs  down”); Axel Haus & Steffen Juranek, Non-
Practicing Entities: Enforcement Specialists? (May 20, 2016) (working paper) (avail-
able at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2424407) (providing a 
theoretical model and empirical support for this view of PAEs). 
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Table 12: PAE Purchases 
 
Num. Packages Purchased 198 
Num. (%) Purchased from Pub. Op. Cos. 67 (34%) 
Num. (%) Purchased from Priv. Op. Cos. 53 (27%) 
Num. (%) Purchased from Def. Aggregators 3 (2%) 
Num. (%) Purchased from PAEs 27 (14%) 
Num. (%) Purchased from Individuals 35 (18%) 
Num. (%) Purchased from Universities 9 (5%) 
 
Finally, we observe that a small but significant percentage of PAE patents 
were purchased from universities.  As shown below in Table 13, sales to PAEs 
constitute the overwhelming majority of all packages sold by universities.100 
Based on the listing prices of packages transferred from universities to PAEs, 
we estimate that universities earned a total of about $13 million from brokered 
sales of 115 assets to PAEs during the five years covered by our study.  Inter-
estingly, these sales took place despite a public stance among universities that 
“universities would better serve the public interest by . . . requiring their licen-
sees to operate under a business model that encourages commercialization and 
does not rely primarily on threats of infringement litigation to generate reve-
nue.”101  These transactions, and the substantial monetary reward associated 
with them, may help explain why universities so strenuously opposed patent 
 
 100. See Yarden Katz, Universities Have Turned over Hundreds of Patents to Pa-
tent Trolls, MEDIUM (Oct. 13, 2016), https://medium.com/@yardenkatz/universities-
have-turned-over-hundreds-of-patents-to-patent-trolls-99d5cdec1d8a#.315c8xj7c (re-
porting that “nearly 500 of IV’s patents originally belonged to universities, including 
state schools”). 
 101. IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NINE POINTS TO CONSIDER IN LICENSING UNIVERSITY 
TECHNOLOGY 8 (Mar. 6, 2007), http://news.stan-
ford.edu/news/2007/march7/gifs/whitepaper.pdf. 
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reform legislation in recent years.102  They may also support ongoing efforts to 
encourage individual universities to pledge not to sell patents to PAEs.103 
 
Table 13: University Patent Sales 
 
 Packages Assets 
Num. Sold 14104 178 
    Num. (%) Sold to Pub. Op. Cos. 2 (14%) 11 (6%) 
    Num. (%) Sold to Priv. Op. Cos. 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
    Num. (%) Sold to Def. Aggregators 2 (14%) 37 (21%) 
    Num. (%) Sold to PAEs 9 (64%) 115 (65%) 
C.  Technology 
Finally, we examine how transactions differ across various technologies.  
Table 14 below presents our data broken down into four broad technology cat-
egories.  We first observe that the vast majority of packages relate to computing 
and telecommunications.  Together, patents covering software and hardware 
 
 102. See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, Patent Trolls Have a Surprising Ally: Universities, 
WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Nov. 30, 2013), http://www.washing-
tonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/30/patent-trolls-have-a-surprising-ally-uni-
versities/ (noting that several university groups publicly expressed opposition to a pa-
tent reform bill “target[ing] patent trolls” that passed in the House in 2013). 
 103. See Elliot Harmon, Tell Your University: Don’t Sell Patents to Trolls, 
ELECTRIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 17, 2016), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/08/tell-your-university-dont-sell-patents-trolls 
(introducing a campaign to encourage universities to agree to a “Public Interest Patent 
Pledge” stating that they would “take appropriate steps to research the past practices of 
potential buyers or licensees and favor parties whose business practices are designed to 
benefit society through commercialization and invention” and “strive to ensure that any 
company we sell or license patents to does not have a history of litigation that resembles 
patent trolling”). 
 104. One additional package containing fifteen total assets was transferred back to 
its faculty inventor.  During this time, universities also tried unsuccessfully to sell many 
more assets on an ad hoc basis.  For example, in 2014 Penn State held an online patent 
auction that netted just one sale.  See Goldie Blumenstyk, Penn State’s Patent Auction 
Produces More Lessons Than Revenue, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 1, 2014), 
https://www.chronicle.com/blogs/bottomline/penn-states-patent-auction-produces-
more-lessons-than-revenue/ (“[T]he university got just one bid on [a] single pair of pa-
tents out of 53 batches” and that bidder “offered the minimum bid, $10,000.”). 
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for computers and mobile devices make up about eighty-eight percent of bro-
kered listings and ninety-five percent of brokered sales. 
This of course means that we saw very few packages related to pharma-
ceuticals, biotech, or medical devices.  Though surprising at first glance, this 
finding actually meshes well with what we know about the biopharma industry, 
as well as with many of the observations described above.  For one, while com-
plex consumer electronics often incorporate tens of thousands of patented tech-
nologies,105 medical treatments are typically protected by no more than a hand-
ful of patents.106  Thus, we would expect there to be relatively few patents 
worth transacting in those fields.  In addition, PAEs virtually never enforce 
patents on drugs, diagnostics, or other medical technologies,107 and thus there 
is little risk for operating companies in this field to mitigate through proactive 
purchases.  Though there is a great deal of technology transfer in these indus-
tries,108 it does not appear to occur through the brokered market.  In our expe-
rience, it happens instead primarily through mergers and acquisitions, in which 
entire startups (including their patent rights) are transferred to established 
firms.109 
 
 105. RPX once estimated that approximately 250,000 patents cover some aspect of 
a smartphone.  RPX Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Sept. 2, 2011) (availa-
ble at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ed-
gar/data/1509432/000119312511240287/ds1.htm).  Another study put the total (includ-
ing design patents) at close to 315,000.  JOEL R. REIDENBERG ET AL., PATENTS AND 
SMALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE SMARTPHONE INDUSTRY 6 (Jan. 15, 2015), 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/stud-
ies/clip_smartphone_patent.pdf. 
 106. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a 
Drug? Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 316–17 (2010) (reporting that pharmaceuticals are 
typically protected by just two to four patents per drug). 
 107. See 2016 Annual Patent Dispute Report, UNIFIED PATENTS (Jan. 1, 2017), 
https://www.unifiedpatents.com/news/2016/12/28/2016-annual-patent-dispute-report 
(reporting that just 39 of the 2630 total cases filed by PAEs in 2016 asserted patents 
covering “medical” technology, defined as “[t]echnologies relating to pharmaceuticals, 
medical devices, and any other health-related technologies”). 
 108. See Chien, supra note 11, at 1701–02 (finding that approximately one to two 
percent of biotech patents changed hands each year between 2012 and 2015); Serrano, 
supra note 11, at 693 (reporting that sixteen percent of patents covering “drugs and 
medical” technology were transferred during their term of protection, the highest rate 
observed among technology classifications). 
 109. See John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: 
Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 167 
(2001) (“[T]he American biotechnology industry . . . . operates according to a ‘mayfly’ 
or ‘small company’ model that explicitly seeks to unleash hundreds of small, lean (with 
regard to capital resources), and largely similar firms to engage, for the duration of their 
frequently short lives, in a voracious search for ways of converting bioscience into mar-
ketable technology.”); Jonathan M. Barnett, Cultivating the Genetic Commons: Imper-
fect Patent Protection and the Network Model of Innovation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
987, 1010 (2000) (“Since . . . 1980, biotechnological product development generally 
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45 12 16 5 78 
 
has taken place through collaborative networks that . . . match up a small biotechnology 
firm, which primarily attends to basic research and early product development, and a 
large pharmaceutical firm, which primarily attends to clinical testing, marketing, and 
distribution.”). 
 110. The “other” category includes patents covering medical, pharmaceutical, and 
other miscellaneous technologies. 
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Looking closer at the technology categories for which we did see a large 
number of packages, software stands out as the most interesting.  During the 
period of our study, more software packages were offered for sale than the 
combined total of packages including hardware- and communications-related 
assets.  Software packages were also listed with higher per-asset prices, about 
fifteen percent above the overall average.  Moreover, these prices do not seem 
to have been viewed as unduly high by purchasers because software packages 
sold at higher rates than all other packages and ultimately made up more than 
half of all packages sold during the period of our study.  Post-purchase, soft-
ware patents were asserted most often, too, accounting for almost sixty percent 
of litigated packages. 
What makes these findings even more interesting is that they span a pe-
riod when several legal developments called into question the patentability of 
software and erected additional hurdles to the enforcement of issued software 
patents.  Special administrative procedures for challenging issued “covered 
business method” patents became available in September 2012.111  To date, 
more than 500 of these challenges have been initiated against software patents 
asserted in court.112  In addition, perhaps no development in the last decade has 
affected the patent system more than the revival of limitations on patentable 
subject matter.  In the wake of the Supreme Court’s June 2014 opinion in Alice 
 
 111. For an overview of procedural rules applicable in “covered business method” 
reviews, see Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-pa-
tent-decisions/trials/transitional-program-covered-business (last visited May 22, 2018). 
 112. See LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com (statistics collected on Feb. 21, 
2017).  Since the creation of CBM review, more than 500 petitions for review have 
been filed.  Id.  Approximately eighty-six percent of petitions litigated to an institution 
decision on the merits were instituted by the PTAB.  Id.  About eighty-seven percent 
of instituted petitions litigated to a final decision on the merits resulted in the cancella-
tion of all instituted claims.  Id. 
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v. CLS Bank, which significantly curtailed the scope of patentable subject mat-
ter for software-enabled invention,113 many made dire predictions about the 
case’s impact on the value of high-tech patents.114 
However, as shown below in Table 15, the market for software patents 
hardly cratered in 2012 or 2014.115  To be sure, we observe that per-asset prices 
for software patents fell between 2012 and 2015.  Median per-asset asking 
prices fell more than twenty-five percent over this period.  However, we also 
observe that prices rebounded in 2016.  In addition, the size and number of 
software patent packages increased markedly during the period of our study. 
In our view, these trends likely reflect the introduction – and subsequent 
dissipation – of uncertainty in the market for software patents over the last five 
years.  As uncertainty about the patentability and enforceability of software 
assets grew, sellers responded by lowering asking prices and buyers responded 
by buying larger packages, perhaps in hopes that at least one asset in the pack-
age would eventually prove valuable.  Over time, prices began to recover as 
case law on software patentability continued to develop and as PTAB practice 






















 113. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358–59 (2014). 
 114. See, e.g., Kelly Mackin, How Alice Is Undermining the American Economy, 
LAW360 (Mar. 29, 2016, 10:30 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/773025/how-
alice-is-undermining-the-american-economy (estimating that the Alice decision re-
sulted in “$24 billion in direct economic damage” to patent owners and possibly as 
much as “$40 billion or even $60 billion”). 
 115. Accord Chien, supra note 11, at 1700 (finding that “[r]ather than declining, 
the absolute number of software patent transfers has actually increased, from around 
5,900 patents per year in 2012 to 8,900 patents per year in 2015, a 68% rise”). 
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Table 15: Software Patents by Year 
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 116. See supra note 72. 
 117. As with all annual sales figures reported supra, these statistics reflect observ-
able assertions (initiated before December 31, 2016) of patents that were listed for sale 
in the indicated year, not all observable assertions that took place during the indicated 
year (regardless of when the asserted patent was listed).  Thus, for example, the data in 
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We see further evidence for this interpretation when we isolate deals in-
volving U.S. patent assets assigned to PTO Tech Center 3600.  TC 3600 spe-
cializes in examining “business method” applications and includes three work 
units devoted to examining applications covering “electronic commerce.”118  
As shown below in Table 16, we see a much steeper decline in prices for these 
assets.  While the overall average asking price for software patents fell about 
twenty percent between 2012 and 2016, average per-asset asking prices for 
business method patents dropped almost forty percent.  In fact, during this 
timeframe business method patents transitioned from among the most valuable 
software patents on the market to among the least valuable. 
Again, these findings are consistent with the market responding to avail-
able information about changes to the patent system.  As several commentators 
have concluded, the impact of Alice has in large measure been limited to “busi-






the adjacent column is meant to communicate that four software packages listed in 2012 
were subsequently purchased and asserted (before December 31, 2016).  And, these 
four software packages represent fifty-seven percent of the seven total packages listed 
in 2012 that were subsequently purchased and asserted. 
 118. U.S. patent examiners are divided into nine “technology centers,” each subdi-
vided into a number of “work units” that, in turn, are further subdivided into “art units.”  
See Patent Technology Centers Management, supra note 44.  Though titled “Transpor-
tation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security and License 
and Review,” Technology Center 3600 is the primary tech center for applications cov-
ering business methods.  See TC 3600 Management Roster, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF.,  https://www.uspto.gov/patent/contact-patents/tc-3600-management-roster (last 
visited May 22, 2018); Robert R. Sachs, Two Years After Alice: A Survey of the Impact 
of a “Minor Case” (Part 2), BILSKIBLOG (June 20, 2016), http://www.bilskib-
log.com/blog/2016/06/two-years-after-alice-a-survey-of-the-impact-of-a-minor-case-
part-2.html (reporting that applications examined by TC 3600 have been rejected on 
patentable subject matter grounds more often than those examined by any other tech-
nology center).  Within TC 3600, work units 3620, 3680, and 3690 specialize in busi-
ness method patents related to “electronic commerce” and include art units devoted to 
“Coupons,” “Electronic Shopping,” “Accounting,” and “Finance/Banking/Insurance.”  
TC 3600 Management Roster, supra. 
 119. See Mark Summerfield, How the Fate of Software and Business Method Pa-
tents Has Turned on USPTO Directors and the Courts, PATENTOLOGY (Jan. 8, 2017, 
3:53 PM), http://blog.patentology.com.au/2017/01/how-fate-of-software-and-busi-
ness.html (comparing PTO data on applications examined in tech centers 3600 and 
2100 and concluding that “in established fields of software technology . . . neither US 
court decisions nor changes in management have resulted in any identifiable deviation 
in US patent grant rates” despite the fact that “the US Supreme Court decision in Alice 
looks to have eliminated about 75% of new business method patents”); Sachs, supra 
note 118 (showing that patentable subject matter rejections are largely isolated to Tech 
Center 3600). 
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Table 16: Business Method Patent Sales by Year 
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 120. See supra note 72. 
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V.  ANALYSIS 
Synthesizing the findings reported above, we draw three broad conclu-
sions from our data regarding what the brokered market can tell us about how 
to value patented technology, what operating companies can do to respond to 
the patent “troll” problem, and what the market can tell us about the future of 
the patent system. 
First, our data strongly suggests that the brokered market for patents is 
primarily, and perhaps almost exclusively, a market for the transfer of potential 
legal liability, not a market for the transfer of technology.  Over ninety-nine 
percent of the packages that we observed were made up exclusively of patent 
assets.  None of these packages included copyrights, trademarks, or trade se-
crets, let alone other forms of technological knowhow like software, proto-
types, or technical documentation.  In addition, our findings suggest that buyers 
tend to value just a few assets per package, particularly assets that are the sub-
ject of an EOU suggesting that they are infringed by a large, profitable tech 
company.  Moreover, a large percentage of patents that are sold (about fifty-
seven percent of packages) winds up in the hands of PAEs and defensive ag-
gregators, neither of which commercialize technology.  And, finally, the over-
whelming majority of patents offered and purchased on the brokered market 
cover computing and telecommunications technologies, which generally can 
be (and often are) transferred without significant patent protection.121 
One important consequence of this conclusion is that prevailing prices in 
the brokered market may be of limited use for purposes of calculating damages 
in patent suits.  While courts and commentators alike have called for the in-
creased use of evidence derived from the market for “real world” patent trans-
actions,122 we are not convinced that data from the brokered market is a pana-
cea for concerns about damages calculations.  If we are correct that prices in 
the brokered market largely reflect buyers’ and sellers’ estimates of the litiga-
tion value of available assets, then brokered market data falls prey to the same 
“circularity” concerns that a long list of commentators has raised against undue 
reliance on prior license agreements.123  True technology transfer, it would ap-
pear, remains hidden from public view even more so than the brokered market 
for “bare” patent transactions. 
Yet another consequence of the market’s basis in liability, not technology, 
is that the market itself represents another heretofore largely hidden source of 
 
 121. A 2008 survey of entrepreneurs found that only twenty-four percent of soft-
ware startups owned patent assets and that “first-mover advantage,” not patent protec-
tion, was ranked the most “important” means to “capture competitive advantage” in the 
software industry.  Stuart J. H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the 
Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1255, 1277, 1289–90 (2009). 
 122. The Supreme Court, for example, has referred to prior licenses of the patent-
in-suit as the “best measure of damages.”  Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322, 326 (1886). 
 123. See, e.g., Masur, supra note 6, at 122. 
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indirect costs and benefits from patent monetization.  While lawsuits and dam-
ages awards are publicly accessible, most patent assertions never make it to 
court.124  The brokered market, thus, offers a window into the costs of potential 
patent assertions that were nipped in the bud with a defensive acquisition.  Dur-
ing the five years covered by our study, we estimate that operating companies 
and defensive aggregators spent hundreds of millions of dollars purchasing pa-
tents for the primary purpose of reducing their exposure to patent assertion.  At 
the same time, our data also reveals that a large number of assets, worth billions 
of dollars in the eyes of brokers and their clients,125 were never sold.  While 
defending a patent suit is undoubtedly expensive, bringing one is not cheap 
either.126  To at least some extent, these unsold assets represent potential value 
that cannot be realized due to the high transaction costs involved in transferring 
patent rights.  At the same time, then, they likewise represent potential risk to 
operating companies that could reemerge if the costs or returns to enforcement 
shift in the future. 
Second, we find that operating companies, particularly large publicly 
traded firms, are the most active sellers and buyers in the brokered market.  
Perhaps most importantly, we see that operating companies are the source of 
about sixty percent of packages acquired by PAEs.  This observation suggests 
to us that PAEs are, in significant part, a collective action problem among op-
erating tech companies.  While the tech industry on the whole decries patent 
monetization as a net drag on innovation, in some situations tech companies 
face strong financial incentives to sell their own assets to PAEs for assertion 
against their competitors.  Were operating companies better able to achieve and 
enforce ex ante agreements not to sell to PAEs, it seems likely that the level of 
PAE activity would significantly decline.  Without access to a stream of assets 
from large tech companies, fewer PAEs would be able to subsist on a diet of 
patents sourced from individual inventors and failed startups.  Thus, our data 
may suggest that self-help solutions that facilitate the “mutual disarmament” 
of patent assets among operating companies may be more promising than pre-
viously recognized.  Existing initiatives, like the License on Transfer (“LOT”) 
 
 124. See Mark A. Lemley, Kent Richardson & Erik Oliver, The Patent Enforcement 
Iceberg (Dec. 18, 2017) (working paper) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3087573) (reporting that, among respondents in a survey of tech-
nology companies, about two-thirds of patent licensing demands eventually resulted in 
litigation). 
 125. The cumulative asking price for all unsold assets that we observed is approxi-
mately $4 billion. 
 126. According to the AIPLA’s most recent survey of its membership, the median 
cost of litigating a patent suit with less than $1 million at stake through the end of 
discovery is $250,000.  AIPLA, 2017 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I-118 (2017) 
(on file with authors). 
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Network127 and the Open Innovation Network (“OIN”),128 provide a useful 
blueprint for ex ante coordination among operating companies. 
Third, we find less market fluctuation over time than many might expect.  
During the period covered by our study, the U.S. patent system saw a number 
of major changes, some of which elicited near-apocalyptic predictions.129  De-
spite this, we saw no drastic swings in the market.130  While overall prices do 
appear to have fallen significantly since 2012, software patents continue to sell 
for substantial sums of money, and the market appears to have correctly as-
sessed (before many commentators) that the impact of Alice would be largely 
contained to business method patents.  Though the data that we present is 
purely descriptive, our observations suggest to us that the brokered market re-
flects a cool-headed assessment of the profitability of patent monetization (at 
least when viewed in the aggregate) and, thus, has at least some promise for 
use as a metric for predicting and gauging the impact of changes in law and 
procedure. 
However, we also acknowledge that our data is limited in a number of 
respects and that our findings and conclusions should be considered with those 
limitations in mind.  As discussed above, our data does not cover all patent 
transfers but only those that followed quasi-public solicitations made by patent 
brokers.  Moreover, while our study is the most comprehensive analysis of 
which we are aware, we nonetheless fail to capture the entire brokered market, 
and thus we cannot rule out the possibility that our observations are biased as 
a result.  In addition, our data on market prices is, by necessity, a work of ap-
proximation.  Asking prices were often interpreted from general ranges pro-
vided by sellers and sometimes were not provided at all.  Also, as discussed 
 
 127. See How LOT Works, LOTNETWORK, http://lotnet.com/how-lot-works/ (last 
visited May 22, 2018) (“Upon becoming a member of LOT Network, when another 
member sells or transfers a patent to a patent troll or PAE, you are automatically granted 
immunity against PAE lawsuits for the life of that patent.”). 
 128. See About OIN, OPEN INNOVATION NETWORK, http://www.openinventionnet-
work.com/about-us/ (last visited May 22, 2018) (“The Open Invention Network is a 
shared defensive patent pool with the mission to protect Linux.”). 
 129. See, e.g., Richard Baker, America Invents Act Cost the US Economy over $1 
Trillion, PATENTLY-O (June 8, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/06/america-in-
vents-trillion.html; Paul Morinville, How the U.S. Is Killing Innovation and Why It 
Matters for Entrepreneurs, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 24, 2015), http://www.ipwatch-
dog.com/2015/10/24/how-the-u-s-is-killing-innovation-and-why-it-matters-for-entre-
preneurs/id=62679/. 
 130. Mark Lemley recently made a similar observation about the patent system as 
a whole.  Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2016) (“Despite the undeniable significance of these changes in both direc-
tions, something curious has happened to the fundamental characteristics of the patent 
ecosystem during this period: very little.  Whether we look at the number of patent 
applications filed, the number of patents issued, the number of lawsuits filed, the pa-
tentee win rate in those lawsuits, or the market for patent licenses, the data show very 
little evidence that patent owners and challengers are behaving differently because of 
changes in the law.”). 
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above, the sales prices we report are approximations derived from a combina-
tion of the asking prices that we observed and a (smaller) benchmark analysis 
of true sales prices.  Thus, we likewise caution that our pricing-related statistics 
are best viewed in the aggregate and, particularly for smaller populations, may 
be significantly biased by individual packages offered at unrealistically high 
prices.  Finally, we note that our data suffers from truncation biases caused by 
the “pipeline” of sales activity that we observed.  Because packages listed in a 
given year often sell the next year (or even later), the sale statistics that we 
report are necessarily incomplete.  In early years (particularly 2012) we were 
unable to observe sales of patents that were listed before our data collection 
began, particularly in 2011.  Similarly, for many patents listed in recent years 
(particularly 2016), it is not possible to observe their eventual sale. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Despite these limitations, we believe our study to be the most in-depth 
analysis performed to date of the secondary market for patents, and our data to 
be the most comprehensive collection possible given the fractured and confi-
dential nature of today’s market.  Overall, our study includes data on almost 
39,000 patent assets listed on the quasi-public “brokered” patent market be-
tween 2012 and 2016.  Using this data, we provide statistics on the size and 
composition of the brokered market, including the types of buyers and sellers 
who participate in the market, the types of patents listed and sold on the market, 
and how market conditions have changed over time. 
Our findings suggest that the brokered market is a market allowing patent 
owners to address potential legal liability and, thus, may not be well suited for 
use in valuing technology.  We also observe that PAEs play a sizeable role in 
the market and most often acquire patents from operating technology compa-
nies.  Thus, our findings suggest that a significant part of the brokered market 
can be viewed as an extension of patent enforcement campaigns that, to date, 
are largely observable only when they enter federal court.  Our data also sug-
gests that operating companies concerned about PAE activity may be well ad-
vised to invest more heavily in the creation of third party organizations that 
facilitate mutual patent disarmament among groups of technology firms.  Fi-
nally, though we do observe a significant decrease in patent sales prices over 
the course of our study, the market (even for software patents) hardly cratered 
in response to the introduction of administrative patent challenges in 2012 or 
the Supreme Court’s 2014 opinion in Alice v. CLS Bank.  To the contrary, the 
market actually grew in 2016.  The brokered market’s behavior during this tu-
multuous time in patent law suggests to us that it may well have utility in pre-
dicting the impact of future changes to patent law and procedure, at least as 
they relate to shifts in the balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants 
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